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ARTICLES
The Courts, Daubert, and Environmental
Torts:
Gatekeepers or Auditors?
ANTHONY Z. ROISmAN*
Introduction
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,' the Supreme
Court declared that admissibility of an expert opinion is not
to be determined by whether the opinion had been generally
accepted, but instead on whether the expert used scientific
methodologies and principles in reaching the opinion, and
whether the opinion offered was relevant to the question
presented. This case unleashed the floodgates of motion prac-
tice related to the admissibility of expert testimony. By the
end of 1996, Daubert had been cited in 527 federal cases, 256
state cases, and 362 law review articles and notes. 2 Count-
less seminars have addressed the question of the post-
Daubert admissibility of expert testimony, and speakers at
virtually every forum that addressed litigation felt compelled
to mention, if not expound upon, Daubert and its
implications.
In 1994, the Federal Judicial Center shifted into high
gear and produced a Reference Manual on Scientific Evi-
* A.B. 1960, Dartmouth College; L.L.B. 1963, Harvard Law School. The
author is Of Counsel to Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll in Washington, D.C.
and has published numerous articles on expert witnesses.
1. 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
2. See id. at 1318 n.10.
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dence3 which included articles designed to help judges under-
stand scientific intricacies. Additionally, this Reference
Manual included an Evidentiary Framework section written
by Professor Margaret A. Berger, which explained the
Daubert holding and how it should be applied.4 Regrettably,
judging by the decisions of courts that faced Daubert chal-
lenges, both the Daubert opinion and all its subsequent anal-
ysis have only produced more confusion and delay, instead of
clarifying the issues and expediting the resolution of pending
cases.
Some of this confusion is directly traceable to the
Daubert opinion itself. Rather than simply stopping at de-
claring the Frye5 rule inapplicable in federal court,6 Daubert
attempted to provide guidance on how to implement Rule 702
of the Federal Rules of Evidence and related rules dealing
with expert opinions. As laudable as this goal may have
been, the briefs of the case provided the Court with little real
guidance on this question.7 In addition, because the Court
itself was not seeking to apply Rule 702 to any particular set
of facts, "observations" by the majority "tend[ed] to be not
only general, but [also] vague and abstract."8
3. REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, Federal Judicial Center
(1994).
4. See id.
5. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Essentially, the
Frye rule states:
[j]ust when the scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable states is difficult to de-
fine. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scien-
tific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id. at 1014. This rule was expanded until it prohibited the admission of any
expert scientific opinion unless the opinion was generally accepted in the scien-
tific community.
6. The Justices were of the unanimous opinion that the Frye rule is inap-
plicable in federal court. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2793.
7. The Supreme Court considered twenty-four briefs in reviewing this
case, including twenty-two amicus briefs. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2799
(Rehnquist, C.J. and Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8. Id.
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As the Daubert concurrence and dissent noted, this prob-
lem was compounded by the unusual nature of the underly-
ing scientific issues, which were "matters far afield from the
expertise of judges."9 With particular foresight, the concur-
rence and dissent noted that the majority's addition of the
concept of "reliability" to the "relevance" requirement of Rule
402 raised many more questions than it resolved:
[q]uestions arise simply from reading this part of the
Court's opinion, and countless more questions will surely
arise when hundreds of district judges try to apply its
teaching to particular offers of expert testimony.10
Finally, the concurrence and dissent stated:
I do not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge some
gatekeeping responsibility in deciding questions of the ad-
missibility of proffered expert testimony. But I do not
think it imposes on them either the obligation or the au-
thority to become amateur scientists in order to perform
that role. 11
Significantly, the majority did not join issue with the concur-
rence and dissent on the most important question - how far
should the district judge go in resolving conflicting scientific
testimony? It is therefore not surprising that the district
courts, and now some courts of appeal, have come up with
markedly different answers to that question. It is how to re-
solve the problem of conflicting scientific testimony in envi-
ronmental toxic tort cases, that is the subject of this article.
The Role of Expert Opinion
As the subsequent discussion illustrates, and as the con-
currence and dissent in Daubert predicted, there is a wide
disagreement about the nature of the inquiry to be under-
taken when applying Daubert. A principle source of that dis-
agreement may be a misunderstanding about the purpose of
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2800.
11. Id.
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expert opinion. Underlying the view that courts should un-
dertake a searching inquiry into the correctness of the ex-
pert's application of accepted scientific methodology is an
assumption that it is the role of the jury and the court to de-
cide the very issue which the expert is addressing by, in ef-
fect, becoming an expert on that matter. It is clear from the
history of Rule 702 that when experts offer conflicting opin-
ions the court is not to decide which expert is correct. Even in
those instances where the expert only provides the necessary
information for the fact finder to then form an opinion on the
subject, only the jury, and not the court, are to make that
decision.
When the current version of Rule 702 was adopted in
1972, the Advisory Committee Notes observed that the role of
an expert opinion is to assist the jury in evaluating the
facts. 12 Sometimes, the advisors note, the expert only ex-
plains the processes by which the facts are evaluated and
then the jury makes the evaluation. 13 However, it is also per-
missible for the expert to reach a conclusion by indicating the
"inference which should be drawn from applying the special-
ized knowledge to the facts."' 4
Rule 702 presupposes that only when the expert opinion
will assist the jury in deciding a question may it be offered. If
the question is one which the jury can resolve without expert
opinion, no opinion is to be offered. Since the premise of the
expert opinion is that the jury cannot comprehend the matter
without an expert, it certainly makes no sense to assume that
from the expert testimony the jury will become sufficiently
expert to actually decide the scientific question. Rather, the
rule contemplates that what the jury will do is decide which
expert is more credible and rely on that expert, not seek to
decide scientifically which expert is correct.
This role of the expert opinion is reflected in court opin-
ions before the adoption of Rule 702. Those earlier opinions
recognized that the expert's opinion does not answer the fac-
12. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
13. See id.
14. Id.
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tual question which the jury must decide; it only provides the
jury with an expert's view of what the answer to the question
should be, and it is for the jury to decide whether the expert
opinion is credible and what weight to give that opinion.1 5
One of the critical factors to be used by the jury in deciding
what weight to give the expert opinion is to assess the bases
offered by the expert for that opinion. 16
What is significant is that at no time did the courts look
to the jury to decide if the expert was correct - that is, to de-
cide the scientific issue - but only to decide what weight if any
to give to the expert opinion. That experts will have widely
differing opinions about the same subject was not a cause for
the court to decide which expert was correct, but to recognize
the inherent uncertainty among experts in some areas and to
leave to the jury the task of deciding which expert, if either,
to believe.1 7 Since Rule 702 did not alter the function of the
expert opinion, but merely liberalized its admissibility, these
early cases are relevant to understanding the role of the ex-
pert opinion.
Professor Imwinkelried has noted that critics of easy ad-
missibility of expert opinions have argued that juries often
reach the wrong conclusion - that is, they pick the wrong ex-
pert.18 He concludes, citing several studies of jury verdicts,
that the assumption is wrong and that juries actually have
an excellent record of reaching the correct conclusion in cases
where conflicting scientific evidence is offered.19 It is signifi-
cant that juries reach these results, not by becoming scien-
tists, but by using their own common sense to decide which
expert is more credible.
As the following discussion will demonstrate, those
courts which have become enmeshed in deciding not only
whether the expert has used accepted scientific methodology,
15. See, e.g., United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032, 1037 (5th Cir. 1971).
16. See id.
17. See, e.g., Mims v. United States, 375 F.2d 135, 142-43 (5th Cir. 1967).
18. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evi-
dence: A Critique From the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 100 MIL. L. REV. 99,
112 et seq. (1983).
19. See id.
1997] 549
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but whether the expert used it correctly and reached the cor-
rect conclusion, have done so because of the mistaken as-
sumption that it is the task of the court and the jury to
actually decide the scientific question. However, that has
never been the task of the judge nor the jury. Experts offer
opinions to assist the trier of fact in deciding how to interpret
the facts of the case. Like the facts themselves, the expert
opinion is one piece of evidence for the fact finder to interpret.
Just as it is not the task of the fact finder to attempt to inde-
pendently re-enact the events which are the subject of the
case in order to decide what happened, so too it is not the task
of the fact finder to recreate the scientific process of the ex-
pert in order to decide what is the correct scientific
conclusion. 20
The application of the expertise of the expert in the form
of judgments about what conclusions to draw from the rele-
vant scientific data is what separates the expert from the lay
judge and the lay jury. It is nonsensical to believe that lay
judges or lay juries can substitute their inexperience to form
more correct judgments. All the judge can and should do is to
decide that the expert is offering an opinion which is scientific
and not conjecture, and all the jury can do is to decide which
expert opinion is more credible and give it whatever weight
they deem appropriate. 21
Some History of the Dispute and the Daubert Holding
In order to understand the current conflict over the ap-
propriate role for courts when faced with conflicting scientific
opinion, it is necessary to understand the origins of the dis-
pute which gave rise to Daubert. While Daubert involved a
20. Courts are actually very reluctant to allow lawyers to attempt to re-
enact events in the courtroom because of the difficulty of getting everything
precisely right. It is even less likely that the lawyer would be able to recreate
for the jury, or the judge, the entirety of the scientific process so that they can
attempt to decide the scientific question.
21. One of the ways in which the credibility of an expert opinion may be
attacked is to examine some of the data reviewed by the expert in front of the
jury in an attempt to show the jury that the expert reached irrational conclu-
sions. However, that trial tactic is a far cry from examining all of the scientific
data and attempting to reach a scientific judgment based upon that review.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/5
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claim that Bendectin®22 was the cause of certain limb-reduc-
tion birth defects, that issue was merely a vehicle for resolu-
tion of a larger controversy. That larger controversy was over
the extent to which, if at all, courts and juries were being
bamboozled into rendering verdicts based upon the testimony
of scientific experts expressing opinions based on "junk
science."
Those who believed "junk science" was overwhelming
courts and juries and favoring plaintiffs' claims looked to
such popularized versions of the argument as Peter Huber's
1991 book entitled Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the
Courtroom.23 On the other hand, those who favor the view
that it is defendants, with their vast resources, who actually
corrupt good science and perpetuate "junk science," often cite
Robert N. Proctor's 1995 book Cancer Wars and the 1996
book Toxic Deception by Dan Fagin and Marianne Lavelle.
Regardless of the argument's foundation against "junk sci-
ence," the goal was to restrict expert opinions in courts to
those whose views were essentially non-controversial.
The defendant's goal in Daubert was to establish that
only universally accepted scientific opinions, or at least those
that held the backing of the general scientific community,
should be allowed in the courtroom. 24 However, this ap-
proach of "expert opinion by popular ballot of the scientific
community" was firmly rejected by the Supreme Court when
it rejected the Frye rule.25 The Court did make "general ac-
ceptance" of the methodology used by the scientist one of the
many factors to be weighed by a court in deciding whether
the expert testimony is reliable. Moreover, and most impor-
tantly, it was the methodology used, not the opinion, which
was to be reviewed for "general acceptance." The Court em-
22. A drug given to pregnant women for morning-sickness. See PHYsicIAN's
DESK REFERENCE 1109 (31st ed. 1977).
23. This book was cited by the Ninth Circuit when it applied the Frye rule
and rendered the opinion for the defendants in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (1991). For a stinging critique of Galileo's
Revenge, see Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk Schol-
arship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637 (1993).
24. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2792.
25. See id. at 2792-94.
1997] 551
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phasized that the "focus, of course, must be solely on princi-
ples and methodology, not on the conclusions that they
generate."26 Thus, the original Frye rule, which focused on
the general acceptance of the expert's opinion, did not survive
Daubert in any form.
Advocates for restricting the role of scientific opinion in
court, whether representing plaintiffs or defendants, must
have been extremely disappointed by the Daubert outcome.
Not only did the Court reject the Frye rule, but it made clear
that the admissibility inquiry should not focus on the opinion
of the expert, but rather on the methodology used.2 7 In short,
the Court could not exclude an extremely unconventional
opinion from the jury so long as it was arrived at using appro-
priate scientific methodology. "Vigorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on
the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate
means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." 28 In fact,
when the Supreme Court decided Daubert, it established
new, more liberal guidelines for evaluating the admissibility
of expert testimony under those rules, and not, as some have
argued, further restrictions on admissibility.
The Court held that in deciding admissibility, the district
court should be mindful of the jury's paramount role as fact
finder and dispute resolver, of the adversarial process as a
finder of truth, and should not take upon itself the process of
deciding which of two competing experts is correct. 29 Subse-
quent decisions by various circuit courts have confirmed that
the effect of the Daubert decision was to liberalize the admis-
sibility of evidence, not restrict it.3° However, while courts
generally agree that Daubert liberalizes the admissibility of
expert testimony, there is sharp disagreement about the pro-
26. Id. at 2797.
27. See id. at 2795.
28. Id. at 2798.
29. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795-96.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1152 (9th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 946 (1995).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/5
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cess through which the court determines whether an expert
opinion should be admitted.3 '
This disagreement focuses on two separate, although re-
lated, considerations. First, when should a court hold a hear-
ing under Rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence 32 on
admissibility of expert testimony, and what kind of hearing
should it hold? Second, how deep should a court probe into
the reasoning and basis of the expert's opinion to determine
whether it was arrived at by the use of proper scientific meth-
odology? In order to explore these concepts in a realistic con-
text, and thus hopefully avoid the concern of the concurrence
and dissent in Daubert about the danger of examining these
issues in the abstract,33 this discussion will focus on the use
of expert testimony in environmental toxic tort cases. This
field spawns enormous controversy over the use of experts,
particularly on the issue of whether exposure to toxic sub-
stances can cause or contribute to adverse health conditions.
Central Elements of the Toxic Tort Case
Some background is essential to understand the compet-
ing points of view. In an environmental toxic tort case, the
31. Other issues have arisen under Daubert upon which there is sharp disa-
greement. For example, does the Daubert reasoning apply only to "scientific"
opinions or does it also apply to "technical or other specialized knowledge?" See,
e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Admissibility of Nonscientific Expert Testimony:
Should Courts Import the Near Miss Doctrine?, TRIAL, Oct. 1996, at 58, avail-
able in 1996 WL 13323184. See also Thomas v. Newton International Enter-
prises, 42 F.3d 1266, 1270 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding the Daubert analysis is
limited to experts who offer scientific knowledge and is not applicable where the
expert testimony is based solely on "specialized knowledge or skills."). Another
Daubert issue on which sharp division exists is the standard of review to be
used by an appellate court examining a trial courts application of Daubert. See
infra note 128.
32. In part, Federal Rule of Evidence 104 provides:
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions
concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the exist-
ence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be deter-
mined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In
making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence
except those with respect to privileges.
FED. R. Evi. 104(a).
33. See supra, note 8 and accompanying text.
1997] 553
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plaintiff is often exposed to a low dose of some toxic sub-
stance, such as a solvent, pesticide, or heavy metal. Subse-
quently, the plaintiff develops a severe disease, such as
cancer or autoimmune disease, which is alleged to have been
caused by the low dose exposure many years earlier.34
The principal experts in such cases are usually environ-
mental engineers and environmental and occupational health
doctors. Environmental engineers determine whether and at
what level the plaintiffs were exposed to the substance in
question. The environmental and occupational health doc-
tors evaluate the plaintiff's health, health history, and cur-
rent disease to determine whether it is more probable than
not that the toxic exposure caused or contributed to the dis-
ease. The environmental engineer usually requires hard evi-
dence, such as environmental monitoring, or evidence of the
use and disposal of toxic substances from which pollution of
air, water, soil or groundwater can be ascertained.3 5 More-
over, information on the nature of the movement of air, soil
dust, surface water or groundwater is added. Finally, the ex-
pert must use scientific judgment to assimilate the compiled
information and draw conclusions from it.
34. Adverse health effects from exposure to prescription and over-the-
counter drugs are arguably also within the scope of this controversy, but since
the amount of the exposure is usually known and because scientific studies of
the effect of use of the drug are often controlled human experiments, the battle
lines are drawn differently, although the debate over causation is often similar.
However, because virtually all drugs have been subjected to human testing,
courts have often been led to the erroneous belief that only if statistically signif-
icant epidemiologic evidence (that is, testing for adverse health outcomes on
human populations after exposure to a toxic agent) exists can there be proof of
causation. See, e.g., Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 313, mod-
ified, 884 F.2d 166, 167 (5th Cir. 1989). But cf. Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C. Inc., 66
F.3d 1378, 1384-85 (4th Cir. 1995); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 911 F.2d
941, 953-57 (3d Cir. 1990); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 856-
57 (3d Cir. 1990)[hereinafter Paoli 1]. The view that causation can only be
proven where there is epidemiologic evidence has been rejected by the scientific
community. See, e.g., David P. Rall, Relevance of Results from Laboratory
Animal Toxicology Studies, in PUBLIC HEALTH AND PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 515,
515-19 (John M. Last, M.D., D.P.H. ed., 12th ed. 1986). See generally Anthony
Z. Roisman, Conflict Resolution in the Courts: The Role of Science, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1945, 1945-50 (1994).
35. The monitoring can be done either at the time of the alleged exposure or
at some future time.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/5
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The expert's judgment is incorporated into the computer
modeling or other mechanism which is used to evaluate the
magnitude of the exposure. Exposure is then converted into a
dose using modeling techniques to ascertain how much of a
certain substance was inhaled, ingested, or absorbed by the
skin.36 However, sometimes it is possible to calculate a dose
by using biomarkers,3 7 some of which detect toxic substances
accumulated in the body, such as lead, or other heavy metals,
some of which detect biologic changes in cells that cause ad-
verse health effects, and some of which detect increased sus-
ceptibility to diseases.38 Whether calculated by external
exposure evidence or evidence of internal biologic change, the
dose number is only a range, not a precise number. Since
each human is different, knowing the precise dose is not es-
sential in proving the connection to an adverse health effect,
but establishing a range can be important.
The medical experts then take the dose values, submit-
ted by the environmental engineers, to determine the cause
and effect. Occasionally, as in the case of asbestosis, the dis-
ease may be uniquely related to a particular exposure. If the
plaintiff has been exposed and has that disease, the cause
and effect relationship is very straightforward. However, it is
far more common that the plaintiff has a disease which could
have been caused or contributed to by multiple factors.
Generic causation is established when the medical expert
ascertains whether the plaintiffs disease is the type which
could be caused by exposure to the toxic substance involved,
by relying on medical literature, personal experience, and
training. Next, the expert reviews the relevant medical liter-
ature, including reports of government agencies and interna-
tional organizations. Finally, the expert subjectively
determines whether it is more probable than not that the
36. See National Research Council, Biologic Markers in Immunotoxicology,
National Academy Press 83-98 (1992).
37. Biomarkers are detectible changes in the body which are in the nature
of a footprint left by the toxic substance. Also known as "biologic markers,"
these "are measurements on biologic specimens that will elucidate the relation-
ship between environmental exposures and human diseases, so that such expo-
sures and diseases can be prevented." Id. at 11-12.
38. See id. at 13-15.
1997] 555
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toxic substance could cause or contribute to the plaintiffs
disease.
Subsequently, a separate analysis is required to deter-
mine whether the particular exposure caused or contributed
to that particular plaintiffs disease. Such an analysis re-
quires careful review of the plaintiffs medical history, work
history, and environmental exposure history, including hab-
its such as smoking and alcohol use. Also, the dose levels
from the substances at issue are evaluated. In sum, because
there is a massive amount of material which an expert will
have to review to reach an opinion on toxic exposure and cau-
sation, it is important to clarify the process courts use to eval-
uate the admissibility of expert opinions.
The Rule 104(a) Hearing: When and What Kind?
A Daubert hearing arises under Rule 104 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Even before reaching the question of the
nature of the Rule 104(a) hearing, it is necessary to deter-
mine when such a hearing must be held. In Hopkins v. Dow
Corning Corp. , 9 the Ninth Circuit held that "[t]he district
court is not required to hold a Rule 104(a)[Daubert] hearing
.... 4 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. ,41 the court
noted that when the proponent of the testimony makes a
prima facie showing of admissibility, a 104(a) hearing is held
only if the opposing party demonstrates that a "material dis-
pute" exists regarding the alleged failure of the expert to fol-
low accepted scientific methodology or reasoning. 42
Even if the moving party meets the material dispute test,
the court must still decide what kind of hearing to hold under
Rule 104(a). Using the discovery process, a party should be
able to develop all relevant evidence for a Daubert challenge.
Professor Berger notes that the discovery process, including
depositions and other devices to adversarially test the posi-
tions of the parties, are preferable to the use of affidavits
39. 33 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, sub nom. Dow Corning Corp.
v. Hopkins, 115 S. Ct. 734 (1995).
40. Id. at 1124.
41. 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
42. See id. at 1318 n.10.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/5
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(which then require an evidentiary hearing), which cannot be
so tested.43 The existence of the new Rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides even more reason to avoid
evidentiary hearings on expert admissibility.
When Rule 26 was amended in 1993, it added significant
new disclosure requirements on experts. These new require-
ments included a full explanation of the opinions offered, the
reasons and basis for those opinions, and the automatic right
to depositions. 44 Failure to fully disclose the opinions of an
expert under Rule 26 can result in exclusion of additional ex-
pert opinions pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 45 Thus, each party has a full opportunity
to explore in detail the reasoning and basis for expert opin-
43. See Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the
Daubert Test, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1345, 1374-75 (1994).
44. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B), which provides:
[e]xcept as otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, this disclo-
sure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially
employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as
an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony,
be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the wit-
ness. The report shall contain a complete statement of all opinions
to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefor; the data or
other information considered by the witness in forming the opin-
ions; any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the
opinions; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all
publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten
years; the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and
a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an
expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years.
Id. The right to depose identified experts whose opinions may be presented at
trial is authorized by Rule 26(b)(4).
45. See FED R. Cirv. P. 37(c)(1), which provides:
A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose infor-
mation required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1) shall not, unless such a
failure is harmless, be permitted to use as evidence at a trial, at a
hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not so disclosed.
In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court, on motion and
after affording an opportunity to be heard, may impose other appro-
priate sanctions. In addition to requiring payment of reasonable
attorney's fees, caused by the failure, these sanctions may include
any of the actions authorized under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C)
of subdivision (b)(2) of this rule and may include informing the jury
of the failure to make the disclosure.
13
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ions during the discovery phase of the case, unlike pre-1993,
when the experts offered only a summary opinion and deposi-
tions of experts were discretionary with the court. This ex-
ploration should provide each party with all the necessary
information to demonstrate to the court why a particular ex-
pert's opinion should or should not be accepted.
Despite the strong reasons for avoiding an evidentiary
hearing, the Courts are split on the nature of the 104(a) hear-
ing. Some urge wide-ranging evidentiary hearings which
may last weeks, while others lean toward a paper hearing
where lawyers extract the best arguments from the deposi-
tions and reports of the experts. Professor Margaret Ber-
ger,46 often considered as the leading scholar on the Daubert
process, has sided with those who favor the paper hearing, in
which primary reliance is placed on the record developed in
discovery. 47 Professor Berger's view is consistent with the
language of Rule 104(a) and the Daubert opinion itself, where
the Supreme Court held that the Rule 104(a) inquiry was to
be a "preliminary assessment."48
While logic, case law, and the structure of the Federal
Rule support the view that a Rule 104(a) hearing should nor-
mally not be evidentiary, the Third Circuit and its district
courts, particularly those in Pennsylvania, have rejected that
view and have created a virtual "cottage industry" out of
Daubert hearings. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig.49 is a
case where the district court held five days of evidentiary
hearings based, in part, on a directive from the court in Paoli
I to hold an in limine hearing.50 The process allowed the par-
ties to introduce affidavits and testimony of experts at the
46. Author of the Federal Judicial Center's "Evidentiary Framework" por-
tion of its Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence. MARGARET A. BERGER, FED-
ERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE:
EVIDENTIARY FRAMEWORK (1994).
47. See Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the
Daubert Test, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1345, 1375 (1994).
48. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796 (1993).
This holding was compelled by the Rule 104(a) description of evidence admissi-
bility as a "preliminary assessment." See id.
49. 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Paoli II].
50. See id. at 736.
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/5
GATEKEEPERS OR AUDITORS?
hearing, whose only focus was the Daubert standards and
whether they had been met.51
The Third Circuit, while reversing the district court, es-
sentially endorsed this prolix approach.52 In the case In re
TMI Litig. Cases Consol. H,53 the district court expanded on
the lessons of Paoli II, noting in its opinion:
"[a]ccommodating the parties for two rounds of in limine
hearings required clearing the court's calendar for most of
November 1995, part of February 1996, and part of March
1996."5 4 In effect, courts in the Third Circuit now appear to
be creating a second trial, complete with witnesses and cross-
examination, which sometimes last for weeks, just to decide
the question of whether experts should be allowed to testify
at the actual trial. It is difficult to imagine that the Supreme
Court intended such a result.
Obviously, those courts which hold an expanded Daubert
hearing are, for the most part, focusing on a far broader
range of issues and in a more intrusive manner than courts
which resolve Daubert issues on paper or with relatively
brief, non-evidentiary Daubert hearings. Thus, the issue of
how expansive a hearing should be and how deeply to probe
the issues are related. However, a separate issue exists re-
garding the wisdom of an expanded hearing format that
would apply even if the breadth of judicial inquiry were quite
wide. That issue involves the uses of judicial resources and
the potential for biasing the case outcome, not on the basis of
merit, but on the basis of resources.
Courts inherently possess the authority to grant a di-
rected verdict after presentation of the plaintiffs case and to
51. See id.
52. Curiously, the Third Circuit endorses Professor Berger's view that prior
to the in limine hearing there should be full discovery of the experts, including
depositions, but nonetheless the in limine hearing is allowed (perhaps en-
couraged) to replow the same ground with evidentiary presentations and cross-
examination. See Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 738-39. Also noteworthy, particularly in
light of the manner in which district courts in the Third Circuit are applying
Daubert, the Paoli II court admonished the district courts not to create a trial
when holding an in limine hearing. See id. at 747.
53. 922 F. Supp. 997 (M.D. Pa. 1996)[hereinafter TM1].
54. Id. at 1005.
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grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict after a jury
verdict has been rendered. Thus, allowing testimony by a sci-
entific expert whose methodology and reasoning might not
meet the Daubert test, and leaving it to the jury to reject the
expert's opinion, does not translate into a faulty verdict.55 It
really involves an issue of resources: for example, should the
court and the parties be required to endure a costly trial if, in
fact, one party has no case because one of the key experts
offers inadmissible testimony?56
If the real issue is resources, a court needs to weigh the
relative resource costs of a lengthy Daubert hearing against
the potential resources involved in a full trial. Moreover,
since Daubert hearings are only critical if the plaintiff, who
has the burden of proof, loses a key expert, they represent
win-win situations for defendants - the real advocates of
these lengthy Daubert hearings. For a defendant, a lengthy
hearing offers the possibility of convincing the court to reject
a plaintiffs key expert. Even if unsuccessful, the defendant
gains additional insight into the plaintiffs expert and drains
the plaintiffs resources. In cases where the resources of the
two sides are disparate, and the disparity favors the defend-
ants, courts which allow lengthy evidentiary hearings under
55. In fact, the Supreme Court encouraged courts to err on the side of ad-
missibility, trusting to the jury and the trial process to find the truth. See
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993) ("Vigorous
cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction
on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking
shaky but admissible evidence."). Id. (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61
(1987)).
56. In theory, the challenge could be made to an expert whose exclusion will
not doom the party's case, but in practice is usually only made, at least on be-
half of defendants, when exclusion will lead to summary judgment because
plaintiff is left with no evidence on a key issue in the case. However, sometimes
this strategy fails and while the expert's opinion is excluded, the court admits
the underlying evidence. In this instance, the jury is allowed to consider the
underlying evidence and find for the plaintiff, without the aid of expert testi-
mony. See Carroll v. Litton Systems, No. 92-2219, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 2015
at *10-18, 47 F.3d 1164 (4th Cir. 1995)(unpublished table decision), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 70 (1995) (excluding expert testimony regarding whether plaintiff
had been exposed to toxic levels of contaminants in groundwater, but allowing
the jury to consider and infer that although the levels today in the groundwater
were below toxic minimums, the levels could have been higher in the past,
based upon past dumping practices and the plaintiffs illnesses).
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Daubert should be certain it is really necessary and that the
defendant has a strong prima facie case before proceeding.
A Modest Proposal
If expert discovery provides a full opportunity to identify
alleged flaws in the expert's methodology and reasoning, and
if separate Daubert experts or untested Daubert affidavits are
not allowed, why should there ever be an evidentiary hear-
ing? The only valid reasons would seem to be those driven by
the needs of a court, not the wishes of the parties. If, after
reviewing all relevant material, the court determines that it
has questions for the experts, then the court can sanction a
hearing on those questions. But such a hearing would bear
no relationship to the weeks of hearings held by Judge
Rambo in TMI.57 It would make the court's inquiries the cen-
tral focus of the hearing, not the opposing lawyers' cross-
examination.
The court-sanctioned hearing has several advantages.
First, it places control of the nature of the Rule 104(a) hear-
ing in the hands of the court, and does not subject it to the
wishes of the parties. One of the "gatekeeper" functions of
the court should be to exercise its judgment by taking a hard
look at whether a Rule 104(a) hearing is warranted and to
exercise its judicial power to require the parties to use discov-
ery and their own expert opinions to make their arguments
on Daubert issues, rather than to force the court to "hear" the
same evidence "live."58
Second, this approach provides two thresholds which
must be crossed before there is an evidentiary hearing: a
showing that a "material dispute" exists as to whether an ex-
pert's opinion is admissible and a determination by the court
that the court needs to ask questions of the experts to resolve
that dispute.
57. 922 F. Supp. 997 (M.D. Pa. 1996).
58. Since a court acting as a "gatekeeper" must not base its opinion on the
credibility of the expert, there is no reason to have the court see the expert in
person and hear live testimony. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52
F.3d 1124, 1133 (2d Cir. 1995).
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How Deeply Should a Court Probe?
Whether courts follow the court-sanctioned hearing ap-
proach urged above or follow the expansive hearing approach
of the courts in the Third Circuit, the issue remains of just
how deeply the courts should probe in deciding whether an
expert opinion is admissible under Rule 702.59 There is some
guidance from the language of Rule 104(a) and the Supreme
Court, which both refer to a preliminary, as opposed to an in-
depth, inquiry, but there is still a wide range of judicial opin-
ion in practice on this issue. The analysis begins with the
clear declaration by the Supreme Court that courts must only
look at methodology and principles to see if they are consis-
tent with scientific thought, and not consider the opinions of
the expert.60
While this should have been a fairly bright line distinc-
tion, it has not produced uniform results in the courts. The
problem may arise from attempts by courts to deal with sev-
eral separate, but related, issues. First, under Rule 702, the
evidence must be scientific, which according to Daubert,
means it must have been based on the use of scientific meth-
odology and principles. 61 Second, the expert may rely on non-
record facts and data if it is "of a type reasonably relied upon
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or infer-
ences upon the subject" according to Rule 703.62
Third, even relevant admissible opinions are excludable
if the danger of prejudice "substantially" outweighs the pro-
bative value according to Rule 403.63 Finally, the court can
nullify the effect of expert testimony by directing judgment 64,
or it may grant summary judgment before trial if it concludes
that the testimony is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror
59. See FED. R. EVID. 702, which provides that "[i]f scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowl-
edge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise."
60. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797 (1993).
61. See id. at 2795.
62. Id. at 2797-98.
63. See id. at 2798.
64. See id. at 2798 (citing FED. RULE Civ. P. 50(a)).
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/5
GATEKEEPERS OR AUDITORS?
to conclude that the position supported by the testimony
more likely than not is true.65 The question remains whether
a court in addressing these other issues can probe any deeper
into the expert opinion than it did in deciding the Rule 702
questions.
For example, is a court free to probe into the reliability of
laboratory data used by an expert which the expert believes
is sufficiently reliable, and then reject the expert if the court
disagrees with the expert's opinion of the reliability of the
laboratory data? Such an approach is allowed in the Third
Circuit.66 As developed in Paoli II, the Third Circuit heartily
endorsed the district court approach of deciding which expert
opinion was correct regarding whether a particular labora-
tory procedure was or was not reliable, by using the provi-
sions of Rule 703 as its justification for an in-depth inquiry.67
But, if for purposes of Rule 702 a court is prohibited from
choosing among competing expert opinions or from further
probing an expert opinion, why should it be able to engage in
essentially the same prohibited process so long as it acts
under Rule 703?68
The reasoning in Daubert clearly supports the proposi-
tion that a court inquiry is intended to be a general one, to
provide the court with confidence that the expert is not
merely speculating. The Supreme Court says as much in
summary when it concluded that "[p]ertinent evidence [that
is, it is relevant] based on scientifically valid principles will
satisfy [the reliability and relevance] demands [of the Federal
Rules of Evidence]." 69 If the Supreme Court had intended
that the nature of the inquiry under Rule 703 or 403, or for
purposes of summary judgment, was to be different than that
under Rule 702, it would have said so.
65. See Daubert 113 S. Ct. at 2798 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 56).
66. See Paoli 11, 35 F.3d 717, 747-49 (3d Cir. 1994).
67. See id. at 771-778.
68. See Mendes-Silva v. United States, 980 F.2d 1482, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(holding, in a pre-Daubert case, that an inquiry under Rule 703 must look only
at the methodology and not the opinion of the expert).
69. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2799.
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The question to be answered by courts under each of
those four provisions is different. However, that difference
does not alter the fact that the depth of the court's inquiry
must be limited, or else the federal rules would run afoul of
the prohibition against courts resolving factual disputes be-
tween parties. For example, when courts have addressed the
issue of what type of evidence is permissible for an expert to
rely upon under Rule 703, the inquiry has been very prelimi-
nary, focusing only on the question of whether the evidence is
like the evidence an expert would use, not on whether the
expert is wrong about what conclusion he draws from the evi-
dence. Any further inquiry would go beyond deciding if the
evidence is the "type" upon which an expert would rely.70
If Daubert stands for the proposition that clear limits ex-
ist on how far a court may go in deciding whether to permit
an expert opinion in evidence, regardless of the Rule or proce-
dure under which the inquiry is being made, then courts can
no more challenge the expert's opinion of the scientific data
which he relies on under Rules 403, 703, or summary judg-
ment processes than they could do under Rule 702. But just
how deep should a court probe into the underlying science?
What Have the Courts Decided?
In Paoli 11, the court went far beyond the task of merely
assuring that the expert had used accepted scientific method-
ology. Instead, the court became enmeshed in resolving dis-
putes between competing experts. 71 For example, the court
examined such scientific esoterica as whether a laboratory
was using an established protocol for testing. The question
turned on whether, if the protocols were published in peer-
reviewed journals but were not contained in a bound docu-
70. See, e.g., Mannino v. International Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846, 851-52 (6th
Cir. 1981) quoting with approval from United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d
1285, 1290 (5th Cir. 1971)(en banc) (holding that "[t]he rationale for this excep-
tion [the judicial precursor to Rule 703] to the rule against hearsay is that the
expert, because of his professional knowledge and ability, is competent to judge
for himself the reliability of the records and statements upon which he bases his
expert opinion.").
71. Paoli 11, 35 F.3d at 771-78. A more restrained view of the court's role is
reflected in Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 80 F.3d 777 (3d Cir. 1996).
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ment in the laboratory itself, the protocols were proper.72
The plaintiffs expert relied upon the laboratory results be-
cause in his opinion they were sound. In rejecting the expert
because of his reliance on the laboratory data, either the
court was choosing among competing opinions, which the
Supreme Court has forbidden, or it was resolving factual con-
troversies, which is forbidden under the Seventh Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution. 73
In a recent opinion, the Fifth Circuit appeared to adopt
the approach used by the Third Circuit, when it focused on
whether it agreed with the experts' opinions about the mean-
ing and significance of certain scientific reports. In Allen v.
Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp.,74 the court acknowledged that the
plaintiffs experts had examined the appropriate data for
reaching a decision on whether exposure to ethylene oxide
was the cause of the plaintiffs brain cancer, but the court it-
self examined the same data and concluded that it did not
support the conclusions reached by the plaintiffs experts.
The scientific errors in the court's opinion were legion, the
most glaring of which was its piecemeal examination of the
relevant data. By testing each type of data to see if it alone
sustains the experts' conclusions, the court turned scientific
methodology on its ear. Scientific methodology requires com-
bining all the relevant data and giving weight to each piece,
not judging and rejecting each piece of data because it will
not, by itself, sustain the conclusion reached.75
Most other circuit courts have taken a markedly different
approach to the issue of scientific expert opinion. Adhering
72. See id.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment, in pertinent part,
states: "In suits at common law,... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law." Id.
74. 102 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1996).
75. See Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 532 (11th Cir. 1996), cert.
granted, (holding that "[olpinions of any kind are derived from individual pieces
of evidence, each of which by itself might not be conclusive, but when viewed in
their entirety are the building blocks of a perfectly reasonable conclusion, one
reliable enough to be submitted to a jury along with the tests and criticisms
cross-examination and contrary evidence would supply.").
1997] 565
21
566 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
more closely to both the letter and spirit of Daubert, these
courts have taken a sufficient look at the expert opinion to be
confident that the opinion is based on scientific methodology
and principles, not on pure speculation. These courts have
eschewed any attempt to be drawn into the second and third
level arguments embraced by the Third and Fifth Circuits,
where the courts not only examine whether the methodology
used is scientific, but whether it was used in an unobjection-
able manner.7 6
In McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 77 the court ruled that
disputes about whether a doctor had used the scientific meth-
odology (differential etiology) correctly or the absence of sci-
entific articles supporting the causal connection with the
precise illness were matters for consideration by the jury and
not for weighing in a Daubert analysis.78 "Disputes as to the
strength of his credentials, faults in his use of differential eti-
ology as a methodology, or lack of textual authority for his
opinion, go to the weight, not the admissibility, of his
testimony."79
The Second Circuit again applied its view of the limited
role of the court in examining experts in the context of a sum-
mary judgment motion in In re Joint Eastern & Southern
Dist. Asbestos Litig..80 This case involved the sufficiency of
the expert opinion in a summary judgment context, where
the court of appeals explored the decision of the district court
in substantial depth.81 The court of appeals found that the
district court's decision
76. The Eighth Circuit has adopted a middle ground ruling that courts
should look behind the methodology used to see if it was used correctly, but
should disregard any flaw in the application of the methodology, unless it can
be shown that the flaw makes the opinion unreliable. See United States v. Mar-
tinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1198 (8th Cir. 1993). Thus, for example, in Paoli H, the
Eighth Circuit would have looked to see if the laboratory had a manual contain-
ing its protocols, but would have excluded the expert from relying on the lab
results only if the absence of the manual was shown to have actually (as op-
posed to theoretically) effected the reliability of the laboratory results.
77. 61 F.3d 1038 (2d Cir. 1995).
78. See id. at 1043-45.
79. Id. at 1044.
80. 52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995).
81. See id. at 1132-37.
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was certainly thorough and well-documented, [but] it was
rife with independent assessments of witnesses' conclu-
sions and comparative credibilities, often in a manner that
appears to us to stretch the above-cited passages in
Daubert beyond their limit. We believe that the district
court, in many instances, did engage in the proscribed
practices of 'assess[ing] the weight of conflicting evidence,
pass[ing] on the credibility of the witnesses [and] substi-
tuting its judgment for that of the jury.'8 2
Since admissibility is more of a threshold analysis, and ar-
guably even less stringent than the sufficiency analysis, it is
even more evident that the type of analyses conducted by the
Third Circuit, in the context of a Rule 702 or 703 inquiry, is
too invasive of the functions of the jury.8 3
In Joiner v. General Elec. Co.,84 the Eleventh Circuit
overturned a district court decision excluding the plaintiffs
expert testimony on exposure and causation. Affirming, as
have the Ninth and Second Circuits, that Daubert was in-
tended to liberalize the rules regarding admissibility of ex-
pert testimony, the court concluded:
[tihis gatekeeping role is simply to guard the jury from
considering as proof pure speculation presented in the
guise of legitimate scientifically-based expert opinion. It is
not intended to turn judges into jurors or surrogate scien-
tists. Thus, the gatekeeping responsibility of the trial
courts is not to weigh or choose between conflicting scien-
tific opinions, or to analyze and study the science in ques-
tion in order to reach its own scientific conclusions from
the material in the field. Rather, it is to assure that an
expert's opinions are based on relevant scientific methods,
processes, and data, and not on mere speculation, and that
they apply to the facts in issue.8 5
82. Id. at 1133 quoting Smith v. Lightning Bolt Prods., Inc., 861 F.2d 363,
367 (2d Cir. 1988).
83. See generally Paoli H, 35 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).
84. 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. granted.
85. Id. at 530.
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Among the factors deemed relevant by the court in accepting
the testimony of plaintiffs experts was, first, that the reliabil-
ity of the expert testimony was enhanced by their extensive
qualifications and experience, second, that the district court
had improperly attempted to evaluate the number and relia-
bility of the articles which the experts relied upon rather
than determining only whether relying on scientific articles
was methodologically acceptable, and finally, that the district
court had improperly evaluated whether the experts were
correct in their opinion that the articles supported their
conclusions.8 6
The assessment of reliability also involves reviewing the
basis for an expert's opinion. As previously noted, when an
expert relies on specific research to form an opinion, the
district court must ascertain whether such research is reli-
able. To accomplish this, the court examines whatever evi-
dence is proffered supporting or criticizing the research,
keeping in mind the purpose of the inquiry, i.e., to exclude
opinions based on mere speculation. While this inquiry
cannot be made without some consideration of the quality
of the research in question, the district court's focus is a
narrow one and does not encompass deciding which ex-
pert's conclusions are better reasoned or more appealing.
Nor should the court make independent scientific judg-
ments on the basis of individual studies.8 7
86. See id. at 532-533.
87. Id. at 532. Comparison of this approach to the Third Circuit's handling
of a similar issue underscores the wide gap between the circuits on how to apply
Daubert. In Paoli H, the Third Circuit, while giving lip-service to the admoni-
tion of Daubert to look only at methodology and not opinion, comes up with a
rationalization for avoiding that directive:
[i]f the judge thinks that the conclusions of some other expert are
correct, it will likely be because the judge thinks that the methodol-
ogy and reasoning process of the other expert are superior to those
of the first expert. This is especially true given that the expert's
view that a particular conclusion "fits" a particular case must itself
constitute scientific knowledge - a challenge to "fit" is very close to a
challenge to the expert's ultimate conclusion about the particular
case, and yet it is part of the judge's admissibility calculus under
Daubert.
Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 746 (footnote omitted). It is difficult to accept this cynical
view of the legal process where the court defends a judicial disregard of the
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/5
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The District of Columbia Circuit also follows the princi-
ple that the role of the court in a Daubert proceeding is a lim-
ited one. In Ambrosini v. Labarraque,88 the court reversed
the district court's decision to exclude the opinions of two key
plaintiff experts.89 The district court disagreed with the ex-
pert's opinion about the meaning and significance of certain
scientific studies and concluded that, absent specific scientific
literature directly linking the plaintiffs birth defect to the
particular drug exposure, no causal opinion could be ren-
dered. 90 The circuit court rejected this analysis, finding that
the plaintiffs expert had adequately explained the scientific
basis of drawing conclusions about one birth defect from data
related to other birth defects.91 The court concluded that
"[b]y attempting to evaluate the credibility of opposing ex-
perts and the persuasiveness of competing scientific studies,
the district court conflated the questions of the admissibility
of expert testimony and the weight appropriately to be ac-
corded such testimony by a fact finder."92
Supreme Court's prohibition on looking at expert opinions, rather than method-
ology, based upon the assumption that what the judge is really doing is using
methodology as an excuse to throw out the opinion of an expert with which the
judge does not agree. Nonetheless, apparently in reliance on this rationaliza-
tion, the court later delves deeply into the opinions of the experts regarding the
reliability of data relied upon by one of the experts and resolves the dispute.
88. 101 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
89. See id. at 131.
90. See id. at 137.
91. See id. at 138-41.
92. Id. at 141. Another panel of the same court, reached a somewhat differ-
ent result in a case involving Bendectin®. See Raynor v. Merrell Pharm. Inc.,
104 F.3d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1997). However, that subsequent panel went out of its
way to distinguish the opinion in Ambrosini by noting what it believed were the
unique facts associated with Bendectin®. See id. at 1374. It focused on what it
considered a wealth of epidemiologic studies of Bendectin® all of which failed to
find a statistically significant association between the drug and limb related
birth defects. See id. This distinction appears to have little scientific merit as a
basis for rejecting the plaintiffs' experts, as the trial judge in Blum v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, No.
1027, decided December 13, 1996, made abundantly clear in rejecting defend-
ants JNOV motion in another Bendectin® case. Even though Pennsylvania
still follows Frye, the court, in a well-reasoned and thoughtful review of the
relevant data, had no problem finding there was ample admissible evidence
that Bendectin® is capable of causing limb related birth defects, in that case
severe clubfeet. See Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 560 A.2d 212 (Pa.
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The Ninth Circuit has also defined a circumscribed role
for courts in undertaking a Daubert analysis. In United
States v. Sherwood,93 the court noted that the four suggested
criteria in Daubert (general acceptance, peer review,
testability and error rate) should be applied to the "theory or
technique the expert employs," thus, appropriately steering
the inquiry away from the opinions of the expert.9 4 The
Ninth Circuit has also held that it is sufficient for admissibil-
ity purposes that the experts "based their opinions on the
types of scientific data and utilized the types of scientific
techniques relied upon by medical experts in making deter-
minations regarding toxic causation where there is no solid
body of epidemiological data to review."95 By focusing on the
"types" of data and methodology, the court avoids an inquiry
into the application of those general types of data and meth-
odology and thus maintains a more reserved role in passing
on admissibility.96
The Tenth Circuit has also identified a limited role for
the Daubert inquiry. In Compton v. Subaru of America,9 7 the
court found it acceptable for an expert to offer his opinion on
Super. Ct. 1989) for a history of this case. The arguments that swayed the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in Raynor were viewed by the judge in Blum as evi-
dence of differences of opinion about the meaning of relevant data, a matter for
resolution by the jury, not the court.
93. 98 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 1996).
94. See id. at 408.
95. Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 1994).
96. In light of these findings, a case which bears attention is Hall v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Oreg. 1996). In this case, the district
court considered essentially the same breast implant information as did the
Ninth Circuit in Hopkins, yet, after an extensive analysis of the scientific merit
of the information, resolved the question differently, excluding the plaintiffs
experts. See id. at 1411-12.
A principle consideration in Ninth Circuit cases has been the requirement
that the expert give a full explanation of why her approach is different than the
conventional approach. E.g., Schudel v. General Electric, 120 F.3d 991 (9th Cir.
1997). Significantly, the Ninth Circuit does not then evaluate the merits of the
explanation but leaves such issue to the weight of the evidence and not its ad-
missibility. E.g., see supra Scischilly.
97. 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit also recognizes that
the admissibility tests are different when the expert is not offering "scientific"
knowledge. See McKendall v. Crown Control Corp., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
21035 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 1997); Masayesva v. Hale, 118 F.3d 1371 (9th Cir. 1997).
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the crashworthiness of a vehicle without using any particular
methodology where, as in that case, there was no well-defined
methodology to use. 98 Instead, it was sufficient for the expert
to rely upon "general engineering principles and his twenty-
two years of experience as an automotive engineer." 99
Gatekeeping, Not Auditing
Following the approach of a limited inquiry for Daubert
purposes does not mean, as some may argue, that the courts
are abdicating their "gatekeeper" function. Rather, it means
limiting the court's role to being a gatekeeper and not ex-
panding it into being an auditor. By offering some factors to
be considered in implementing the Daubert decision, the
Supreme Court suggested, by inference, what type of inquiry
the courts should undertake. 100 Nowhere do those inquiries
include factors such as determining whether the court agrees
with the expert that the peer-reviewed scientific article relied
upon by the expert actually supports the expert's opinion, or
whether the court finds data from approved testing methods
which the expert relies upon to be unreliable.
As to the type of articles upon which an expert might
rely, the Supreme Court only noted that a factor to consider is
whether there was publication of the scientific method used,
or theory proposed, by the expert in a peer-reviewed jour-
nal.' 0 If the Court had believed the judge should also review
the article to see if he agreed with the expert's opinion of the
meaning of the article, the Court would have said so, and the
concerns expressed in the concurrence and dissent from the
Chief Justice and Justice Stevens would have been substan-
tially magnified.
Similarly, the only aspect which the Supreme Court fo-
cused on, regarding the data upon which the expert based his
opinion, was the "known or potential rate of error," and
whether the data was gathered using a methodology that fol-
98. See id. at 1519-20.
99. Id.
100. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794-95, n.7
(1993).
101. See id. at 2797.
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lowed standard procedures, assuming such procedures ex-
isted.10 2 There was no suggestion that a court should expand
its inquiry into whether it believed the data gathering entity
properly collected or analyzed the data. Inasmuch as the
"known or potential rate of error" is only one factor to be con-
sidered by the court, and not a dispositive consideration, it is
not surprising that the inquiry would stop before reaching
that level of detail.
Not only did the Supreme Court opinion in Daubert sug-
gest several non-exclusive factors to be considered in deter-
mining the admissibility of expert testimony, but the Ninth
Circuit further elucidated those factors in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm. Inc. 0 3 on remand. Among the factors to be con-
sidered for admissibility is whether the expert's opinions
were developed solely for litigation or whether they arose out
of their pre-existing work.10 4
One district court, quoting from the Ninth Circuit's
Daubert opinion, has confirmed that the "most persuasive
reason for concluding that an expert's testimony is derived
from scientific method is that 'the testimony.., is based di-
rectly on legitimate, preexisting research unrelated to the lit-
igation."'10 5  This factor seems particularly persuasive
because it provides the court with assurance that the expert
is not merely "making up" an opinion for the purposes of the
litigation and that either scientific journals or funders of sci-
entific research have deemed the expert's views to be suffi-
ciently reliable to publish or support them. Once such
acceptance is shown, it is difficult to see how it would be ap-
propriate for a court to undertake any further inquiry into
the scientific validity of the methodology used by the expert,
much less into the merits of the scientific conclusions reached
by that expert. That would stretch the court's expertise well
beyond, its capabilities and would conjure up the specter of
102. See id. at 2796-97.
103. 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
104. See id. at 1317.
105. United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354, 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995).
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the "amateur scientists" of which the concurrence and dissent
in Daubert warned. 10 6
Another factor which courts have accorded substantial
weight in making the Daubert inquiry are the credentials and
experience of the expert. In Joiner,10 7 the court noted that if
the opinion is offered by a scientist with extensive experience
and expertise in the area of the opinion, it augments the reli-
ability of the opinion.108 A similar conclusion was reached by
the courts in Hopkins'0 9 and Ambrosini.110
At the root of the differences between the circuits on how
deeply to probe the expert opinion and what issues to resolve
may be a fundamentally different view of how the scientific
process functions. One explanation for the approach taken in
Paoli II" and other courts in the Third Circuit is that they
believe courts must resolve disagreements between experts
about the reliability of data relied upon by the expert, and
must choose between competing scientific opinions about how
to implement accepted methodologies. That belief may stem
from the view that there is a single scientific truth, and that
it is the duty of courts to decide whether the proffered expert
is offering that truth.
That view was rejected in Daubert when the Court con-
cluded "[o]f course, it would be unreasonable to conclude that
the subject of scientific testimony must be 'known' to a cer-
tainty; arguably there are no certainties in science." 112 The
Court placed the focus of the inquiry on the reliability of the
evidence, not its correctness.1 3 Deciding whether the testing
protocol used by a laboratory was proper, as the court did in
Paoli II, goes beyond testing for reliability of methodology
used and enters the forbidden territory of deciding if the ex-
pert's opinion regarding the appropriateness of the methodol-
106. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2800.
107. 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996).
108. 78 F.3d 524, 532 (11th Cir. 1996).
109. 33 F.3d 1116, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 1994).
110. 101 F.3d 129, 137-40 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
111. 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).
112. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795 (citations omitted).
113. See id. at 2797.
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ogy used is correct. On that latter subject, experts can and do
disagree; it is the task of the fact-finder, not the gatekeeper,
to weigh that evidence.
As the Joiner court concluded, the opinions of the expert
about what weight to place on a particular scientific article or
what conclusions to draw from it are themselves opinions
which are immune from inquiry under the Daubert test.114
Similarly, disputes about the interpretation of scientific data
normally relied upon by experts are not disputes to be re-
solved by the court sitting as a gatekeeper. As the Ninth Cir-
cuit held in United States v. Chischilly,1 5 "the mere
existence of scientific institutions that would interpret data
more conservatively scarcely indicates a 'lack of general ac-
ceptance' under Daubert's fourth factor. 11 6
The District of Columbia Circuit, which originated the
Frye test in 1923, offered an important insight into what it
means to examine the "methodology" used by an expert in an
opinion decided almost a decade before Daubert. In Ferebee v.
Chevron Chemical Co. ,117 counsel for plaintiff offered the tes-
timony of treating physicians that the cause of plaintiffs
death was exposure to paraquat.118 Defendant argued that
unless plaintiff could produce epidemiology 1 9 and animal
studies that showed paraquat was capable of causing the ill-
ness and death claimed by the plaintiff, then the plaintiff
could not prevail.1 20
In rejecting this demand for generic causation proof, the
court held:
[als long as the basic methodology employed to reach such
a conclusion is sound, such as use of tissue samples, stan-
114. Joiner, 78 F.3d at 532. Accord Ambrosini, 101 F.3d at 135-37.
115. 30 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1994).
116. Id. at 1154.
117. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
118. See id. at 1535.
119. Epidemiology is the "[sicience concerned with defining and explaining
the interrelationships of factors that determine disease frequency and distribu-
tion." AM. JuR. 3d Proof of Facts Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 606
(1989).
120. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1535.
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dard tests, and patient examination, products liability law
does not preclude recovery until a 'statistically significant'
number of people have been injured or until science has
had the time and resources to complete sophisticated labo-
ratory studies of the chemical. In a courtroom, the test for
allowing a plaintiff to recover in a tort suit of this type is
not scientific certainty but legal sufficiency; if reasonable
jurors could conclude from the expert testimony that para-
quat more likely than not caused Ferebee's injury, the fact
that another jury might reach the opposite conclusion or
that science would require more evidence before conclu-
sively considering the causation question resolved is
irrelevant. 12 1
In cases such as Paoli 11122 and TMI,123 virtually all the ex-
perts used a standard methodology to reach their conclusions.
Plaintiffs' experts were rejected by the courts because the
courts concluded they did not agree with how the methodolo-
gies were applied by the expert or because the courts decided
to agree with one of two competing conclusions about which
methodology was appropriate. Opinions from the Third and
Fifth Circuit contrast with the opinions of the D.C. Circuit,1 24
the Second Circuit,1 25 the Ninth Circuit,1 26 and the Eleventh
Circuit,1 27 which resolve this question differently, thus
presenting an issue ripe for resolution by the Supreme
Court. 128 As the Eighth Circuit observed in Sorensen By And
121. Id. at 1535-36 (emphasis in original).
122. 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).
123. 922 F. Supp 997 (M.D. Pa. 1996).
124. See Ferebee, 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Ambrosini v. Labarraque,
101 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
125. See McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038 (2d Cir. 1995).
126. See Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1994).
127. See Joiner v. General Electric Co., 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996).
128. Indeed, that review may be coming since on March 17, 1997, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 78 F.3d 524
(11th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3629 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1996)(No. 96-
188). While arguably the Supreme Court is only asked to answer the question
of what standard of review an appellate court should use in reviewing a
Daubert decision of a district court, it is likely the Court will also have to an-
swer the question of the proper nature of the district court review, since the
Eleventh Circuit based its reversal on the failure of the district court to apply
the proper legal standard of review under Daubert.
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Through Dunbar v. Shaklee Corp.,129 "[t]he application of
Daubert to difficult admissibility questions concerning expert
testimony, such as those illustrated by the above cases, re-
mains subject to development in the courts."130
129. 31 F.3d 638 (8th Cir. 1994).
130. Id. at 651.
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